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Abstract This paper critically examines the extent to which health promoting wearable
technologies can provide people with greater autonomy over their health. These devices
are frequently presented as a means of expanding the possibilities people have for
making healthier decisions and living healthier lives. We accept that by collecting,
monitoring, analysing and displaying biomedical data, and by helping to underpin
motivation, wearable technologies can support autonomy over health. However, we
argue that their contribution in this regard is limited and that—even with respect to their
‘autonomy enhancing’ potential—these devices may deliver costs as well as benefits.
We proceed by rehearsing the distinction that can be drawn between procedural
autonomy (which refers to processes of psychological deliberation) and substantive-
relational autonomy (which refers to the opportunities people have for exercising potential
actions). While the information provided by wearable technologies may support
deliberation and decision-making, in isolation these technologies do little to provide
substantive opportunities to act and achieve better health. As a consequence, wearable
technologies risk generating burdens of anxiety and stigma for their users and reproducing
existing health inequalities. We then reexamine the extent to which wearable technologies
actually support autonomous deliberation. We argue that wearable technologies that
subject their users to biomedical and consumerist epistemologies, norms and values also
risk undermining processes of genuinely autonomous deliberation.
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1 Introduction
This paper engages with some of the ethical questions regarding autonomy posed by
the proliferation of what we shall call ‘health promoting wearable technologies’. For
the purpose of this paper, these are defined as digital self-tracking devices designed to
improve the health, fitness and well-being of their users by collecting, analysing and
displaying biomedical data. These technologies are often presented as a means of
expanding the possibilities their users have for making healthier decisions and living
healthier lives. Central to their appeal is the claim that the information and motivation
they provide will grant people greater autonomy over their health, enabling people to
become fitter, healthier and happier. We draw on a combination of ethical and social
theory to subject this claim to critical scrutiny.
The term ‘health promoting wearable technologies’ could be taken to refer to a long
and diverse list of items—spectacles, false teeth, prosthetic limbs, pace-makers, hearing
aids or even a sturdy pair of walking boots. But we are using it in a more restrictive
sense. In particular, we have in mind the spectrum of discrete, mobile digital devices
(hardware) and the various programmes, apps and interactive bots (software) that have
been developed to enable people to monitor, collect, analyse and display biomedical
data. Popular examples of such wearable technologies include fitness bands dedicated
to tracking health and fitness, more versatile smartphones, smart watches and assorted
devices integrated into clothing, footwear and jewellery made by companies like Apple,
Fitbit, Google, Hexoskin, Jawbone, Misfit, Nike, Ringly and Samsung. These devices
support thousands of apps and bots, popular examples of which include Apple Health,
Calorie Counter, Endomondo, Forksy, Google Fit, Heart Analyzer, Lifesum and Strava.
Health promoting wearable technologies are becoming increasingly popular. Ac-
cording to Morgan (2016), we are witnessing the proliferation of mobile and wearable
technologies globally for the purpose of tracking and monitoring health, fitness and
well-being. As of 2014, 45.8 million American smartphone owners were reported to
have used a fitness and/or health app (Nielsen 2014), while Fitbit alone is reported to
have sold over 23 million devices in the 2015–2016 financial year in over 65 countries
worldwide (Fitbit 2017b). Uptake in these technologies is anticipated to continue to
grow as technologies evolve and consumer demand rises (Martin 2015).
The paper begins by considering how health promoting wearable technologies might
support health-related autonomy. We then subject this idea to critical analysis through
two interlinked arguments. Firstly, we rehearse the distinction that can be drawn
between procedural autonomy (which refers to processes of psychological deliberation)
and substantive-relational autonomy (which refers to the genuine opportunities people
have for action). We argue that while wearable technologies may provide information
that supports processes of autonomous decision-making over health, on their own these
technologies do little to provide their users with genuine opportunities for autonomous
action. Secondly, we raise some concerns about the effects of wearable technologies on
autonomous deliberation. We argue that where wearable technologies incorporate the
biomedical and commercial epistemologies, norms and values of their manufacturers,
they may compromise processes of autonomous deliberation. We therefore conclude
that wearable technologies are limited in how far they can enhance their users’
autonomy over health, and that their effects on autonomy may include costs as well
as benefits.
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2 Wearable Technologies and Enhanced Autonomy over Health
Lupton’s (2016) work on the ‘quantified self’ leads a nascent scholarship that critically
engages with the development of wearable technologies. An important element of this
emerging work will be scrutiny of the ways in which wearable technologies are
presented in popular and commercial discourses. Central to the growing appeal of
health promoting wearable technologies is their promise to enable people to take
greater control over their health through access to biomedical data that was previously
unavailable. For example, Fitbit, a leading manufacturer of health and fitness trackers,
presents itself in this way:
‘Fitbit motivates you to reach your health and fitness goals by tracking your
activity, exercise, sleep, weight and more’. (Fitbit 2017a)
Key to what is at stake in the presentation of these devices is the notion that they
provide ways of enabling and empowering their users to ‘reach their health and fitness
goals’. This appeal is dramatically represented in the following vision for health
promoting wearable technologies presented by Lauren Constantini, chief executive of
health technology company Prima Temp Incorporated, at the TEDxMileHigh confer-
ence in 2014:
‘What might be possible if you could learn from the data your body is radiating
how to make the most of your body and your mind? What would you do with that
power? Well the age of the quantified self is upon us! Self-knowledge through
self-tracking… by looking over time at our good days and bad days… we can
identify the events and manipulate our environment to make us more happy and
less sad and more productive… Not only can we become healthier and more
productive we can become better parents, better caretakers, better lovers,
better humans… We all hear that we are only using about 10% of our human
capabilities, so our future selves can be ten-fold better than our current
selves… And this indicates humanity with potentially enhanced natural
capabilities… What might be possible if you could use techology to expand
your opportunities and abilities to be human beyond what you thought was
possible?’ (Constantini 2014)
It would be unwise to read too much into the sales pitch of an enthusiastic
entrepreneur with a firm interest in the growth of health promoting wearable technol-
ogies. However, this statement is illustrative of the wider discourses that frequently
characterise these devices as a platform for enabling and empowering human beings to
new levels of performance and achievement. Particularly instructive for our purposes is
Constantini’s suggestion that the data these devices provide will offer their users new
powers and enhanced capabilities. This claim is underwritten by the assumption that
users of these technologies will be able (and will wish) to act on the information
provided, by manipulating their environments, thereby taking on new roles and iden-
tities which are ‘ten fold better’ than their current ones. These claims amount to the
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promise that users of wearable technologies will have greater autonomy over their
health, fitness and well-being.
Autonomy is a theme that runs deeply through contemporary cultural attitudes
towards health and policy trends surrounding health promotion. People are increasingly
expecting, and being expected, to be able to contribute positively to, and accept
personal responsibility for, their own health and well-being (Waller 2005). Respect
and support for personal autonomy has become a key plank of contemporary health
promotion discourse and strategy and has been facilitated by a combination of measures
based on enhancing public education, motivation, supporting choice and encouraging
patients and the wider public to actively ‘coproduce’ good health outcomes for
themselves (Owens 2012; Owens and Cribb 2013). Wearable technologies fit squarely
within these trends as a means of informing and enabling individuals’ choices and
facilitating forms of direct participation in caring for their own health. These technol-
ogies promise to dismantle the traditional asymmetry of information that has
characterised clinical relationships where the public rely on expert medical profes-
sionals to collect, monitor and interpret their health data. Having direct access to
biomedical data is presented as a means of empowering people by making them aware
of the state of their body and enabling them to directly self-monitor their habits and
behaviour.
One important dimension to note is the role that psychological motivation linked to
goal setting and fulfilment plays in processes of empowering users of these technolo-
gies to greater autonomy over health. We saw above that Fitbit presents itself as a tool
for motivating people to achieve their health and fitness goals. Samsung presents the
‘Endomondo Premium’ app for its smartphones and watches in similar terms:
‘Using GPS tracking, it logs and monitors your activities, like running, swim-
ming, cycling or even canoeing. You can set personal goals, better understand
your progress, and be inspired to achieve your fitness goals’. (Samsung 2017)
By collecting, monitoring, analysing and displaying information and then providing
advice, prompts, encouragement and recommendations, these devices appear able to
guide, motivate and inspire their users towards realising their specified health and
fitness goals.
We do not doubt that in many cases health promoting wearable technologies can
provide effective support for people seeking to improve their health and fitness.
However, we believe that any suggestion that these technologies support their users’
autonomy over health needs to be critically examined and qualified. To undertake this
critical examination, we first distinguish between different senses of autonomy.
3 Procedural Autonomy over Health
Questions about the nature of autonomy are a central concern within ethics, and
particularly so within healthcare ethics and bioethics. Important contributions to the
debate about autonomy have been made by theorists from across a broad range of
disciplinary traditions and ideological perspectives. To cut through this complexity, we
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rehearse a distinction that can be drawn between two important versions of autonomy: a
‘procedural’ definition that has been highly influential within analytic philosophy and a
‘substantive–relational’ definition that emerges from feminist ethics and contemporary
social theory.
Procedural accounts of autonomy have emerged from within the analytic tradition of
philosophy, where autonomy has been characterised as relating to the cognitive pro-
cesses involved in an individual’s decision-making. The influential liberal account of
procedural autonomy is strongly associated with the personal capacity for self-
governance and the ability to take decisions about one’s own life independently and
without external support, interference or constraint. Accordingly, procedural accounts
of autonomy have tended to emphasise the importance of freedom of will and the
capacity to engage in processes of independent deliberation about the course of one’s
life. The stress placed on independent psychological deliberation means procedural
accounts employ a cognitive criteria for establishing the extent to which a person
can be said to be autonomous. That is, it is concerned with establishing whether or
not a person has undergone, or possesses the capacity for undergoing, the requisite
psychological processes to be deemed autonomous. Frankfurt (1989) has provided
the most influential account of procedural autonomy based on critical reflection
and the ordering and endorsement of desires. Frankfurt’s account suggests that
personal autonomy consists in the capacity to act in line with one’s genuine and
authentic volitions.
Procedural accounts of autonomy suggest that what is important is not the contents
of the desires someone has or the consequences of the decisions they make, but the
reasoning behind these desires and decisions. So long as a person goes through the
necessary cognitive processes, they can be deemed autonomous. These accounts
therefore place a strong emphasis on the importance of protecting deliberative proce-
dures from external interference or corrupting influences. Such concerns can be widely
recognised in discussions surrounding processes of consent and competency. Where
someone is unable to critically reflect, order and/or endorse a set of preferences—
perhaps because they lack the cognitive capacity to do so, because they do not have the
requite information, or if they are subject to some form of external interference—they
are deemed unable to exercise autonomy. On this reading, autonomy with respect to
health means being free to deliberate over and make decisions about one’s health. For
example, this might mean that a person is able to reflectively weigh up information and
then freely decide whether or not to change their diet, quit smoking or take up a new
exercise regime. Here, the key thing is their ability to make independent and informed
decisions via processes of critical reflection and endorsement.
What does this procedural account mean for evaluation of the claim that wearable
technologies are able to enhance their users’ autonomy over health? By providing
access to biomedical data and generating awareness of habits, behaviours and perfor-
mances, there is good reason to think these technologies can support processes of
deliberation about health that enhance their users’ procedural autonomy. For example,
information about one’s heart rate, sleeping patterns, mobility or calorific intake might
help people make important decisions that directly affect their health. Moreover, if
these devices are also able to offer encouragement, motivation and inspiration, they
may help people cultivate and reinforce self-control and intentional habits of mind and
behaviour that are more in line with their endorsed and genuine volitions. This may
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lead to healthier behaviour, whether through a better diet, more consistent compliance
with medical regimes or increased physical exercise. The comedian and essayist David
Sedaris vividly illustrates the potential of wearable technologies to support motivation
and increased physical activity through his experience of using a Fitbit:
‘the Fitbit is a digital trainer, perpetually egging us on. During the first few weeks
that I had it, I’d return to my hotel at the end of the day, and when I discovered
that I’d taken a total of, say, twelve thousand steps, I’d go out for another three
thousand’.
‘But why?’ Hugh asked when I told him about it. ‘Why isn’t twelve thousand
enough?’
‘Because’, I told him, ‘my Fitbit thinks I can do better’. (Sedaris 2014)
If Sedaris’s genuine desire is to improve his health through increased physical
activity, his Fitbit appears to be supporting his autonomy by helping him to meet his
goal of taking more steps each day. In many cases, the data and motivational prompts
provided by wearable technologies appear able to positively support the deliberations
and decisions people make about their health, and may provide the motivation and
encouragement to support them to reach the goals they set for themselves. We will
return to consider this provisional conclusion in more detail later on, but prima facie
there seems good reason to think that wearable technologies can support procedural
autonomy over health.
4 Substantive–Relational Autonomy over Health
A more sceptical assessment of the potential for wearable technologies to support their
users autonomy over health is provided by a broader notion of autonomy, referred to as
a substantive–relational account (Mackenzie 2008; Owens and Cribb 2013). From this
broader view, a focus on processes of cognitive deliberation appears to be relatively
narrow in scope: procedural accounts only tell us part of the story about what autonomy
is, why it is important and how it can and should be promoted. While they may provide
important details about how people have arrived at a particular decision, procedural
accounts tell us little about what people can actually do to enact that decision. We have
argued elsewhere that it is important to understand autonomy in terms of the opportu-
nities people have for free and meaningful action (Owens and Cribb 2013). Indeed, it is
people’s capacity to act and achieve the goals they have decided upon that is often
considered morally and politically salient about autonomy, and we noted above that it is
a promise of supporting action towards health and fitness goals that provides a major
selling point of these devices.
The substantive–relational account of autonomy we have in mind has been derived
from scholarship in feminist ethics, notably writings about relational autonomy
(Mackenzie 2008; Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000). These relational accounts were partly
developed out of a concern to facilitate ‘real-world’ understanding of the practices of
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autonomous decision-making by paying close attention to the ways in which a person’s
circumstances may influence their deliberative processes. In particular, relational ac-
counts of autonomy pay attention to the ways in which a person’s deliberative
processes will be subject to the myriad influences of socialisation. While there is no
definitive account of relational autonomy—i.e. it is a label that permits a variety of
interpretations—its proponents have stressed the need to recognise the social
embeddedness of persons and the causal role that structural circumstances have on
people’s capacity to engage in processes of autonomous deliberation (Westlund 2009).
It is possible to refer to a spectrum of positions derived from the literature on relational
autonomy. For instance, so-called procedural–relational accounts of autonomy ac-
knowledge the importance of socialisation on decision-making but retain the view that
autonomy is essentially a cognitive process bound up with deliberation, albeit one that
must be made answerable to ‘public reasoning’ (Ben-Ishai 2012; Benson 2000). For the
purposes of our argument, we set such intermediate positions aside and concentrate on
those perspectives that depart more radically from procedural accounts of autonomy.
Substantive–relational accounts of autonomy broaden the notion of autonomy
beyond processes of cognitive deliberation to include the possibilities for autonomous
action (Mackenzie 2008; Oshana 2006). Such accounts consider a narrow focus on
procedures of autonomous deliberation as a necessary but insufficient condition for any
account of autonomy that can usefully be applied to evaluate real-life situations,
behaviours and practices. Accordingly, substantive–relational accounts extend the
concept of autonomy beyond the cognitive domain and into the realm of material
and social structures and relationships. They suggest that attention to the impact that a
person’s structural circumstances should not end with consideration of their capacity for
autonomous deliberation, rather it should also include the substantive opportunities
they have to enact the decisions they have made and actually achieve their intended
goals.
It is important to note that shifting attention from autonomous deliberation to
autonomous action involves altering the conceptual focus of the idea of autonomy,
from deciding to acting. This is significant because acting appears to be a far more
complicated activity than deciding: action involves engaging with the myriad types of
antecedent material and social structures that shape the potential actions available to a
person, as well as considering how the consequences of these actions will affect their
future opportunities. For example, while procedural accounts may consider a person
who weighs up the information from their wearable device and then freely decides to
take up a new diet or exercise regime to be autonomous on the basis that they have
engaged in independent cognitive processes of deliberation, a substantive–relational
account would ask additional questions about whether they are in a position to
successfully enact their decision. For example, if the person lacks the money, time,
space and/or confidence required to cook healthier food or go to the gym regularly, the
substantive–relational account could conclude that the person lacked the capacity for
autonomous action.
Substantive–relational accounts of autonomy therefore suggest we must pay atten-
tion to more than just the cognitive processes by which decisions are made: we must
consider the conditions, contents and consequences of a person’s decisions, the cir-
cumstances in which these decisions are made and the implications these decisions
have for their intended actions. A person’s capacity for autonomous action is therefore
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shaped by the variety, quality and quantity of opportunities that their material and social
environment makes available to them, as well as by the extent to which they are willing
and able to exploit these opportunities. On this basis, promoting a person’s substantive–
relational autonomy involves providing them with supportive circumstances and rela-
tionships that confer on them genuine opportunities to enact their decisions.
This shift to a substantive–relational view of autonomy is significant for our
consideration of health promoting wearable technologies because there are good
reasons to be sceptical about any claims that providers of these technologies make
about them offering people genuine opportunities to meet the health and fitness
goals they set for themselves. Health promoting wearable technologies may enable
people to improve their health by supplying information and encouragement, but
they do little to change a person’s capacity to act in the world and to positively
enhance their opportunities for achieving better health. Given that people’s op-
portunities to achieve better health in practice are always mediated by their wider
material and social circumstances, then those people who are relatively well-
positioned may already enjoy circumstances that enable them to act on the
information or prompt provided by their device (e.g. if they are wealthy, confi-
dent, have positive and supportive familial and clinical relationships, have access
to required goods, commodities and facilities, etc.). However, for those people in
less-advantageous social positions (particularly those affected by oppressive con-
ditions linked to isolation, exclusion, poverty, deprivation or discrimination),
simply being informed or encouraged that a particular form of action will help
them to meet their health and fitness goals may not make much, if any, difference.
Providing people with genuine opportunities to act on the information and encour-
agement provided by their devices (and to exercise autonomous action over their
health) will often require attending to the adverse material and social circumstances
that constrain their potential actions. This argument is borne out by the extensive
literature that provides evidence of the causal role that material, economic and social
factors have in creating patterns of health inequalities across society (Dorling 2013;
Marmot 2010, 2015; Marmot and Wilkinson 2005; Pickett and Wilkinson 2015). These
social epidemiological studies clearly demonstrate that the social determinants of
health—the conditions in which people are born, grow, live, work and age, and the
ways in which these conditions are affected by the relative distribution of money,
resources, power, recognition and status—create patterns of unequal health across
society. As Marmot explains, ‘the lower a person’s social position, the worse his or
her health’ (2010: p. 9). Personal autonomy over health, understood in substantive–
relational terms as the genuine opportunities or capabilities people have to act to sustain
and/or improve their health, is substantially shaped by these social determinants (Abel
and Frohlich 2010; Owens and Cribb 2013; Prah Ruger 2010; Sen 1992;).
Wearable technologies are, of course, narrowly concerned with measuring, analysing
and displaying the biomedical data of their users, and not with the wider structural
contexts that shape their health and fitness. As Lupton explains,
‘many digitized health promotion strategies focus on individual responsibility for
health and fail to recognise the social, cultural and political dimensions of digital
technology use’. (2014: p. 1)
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Without engaging with the broader structural conditions that cause patterns of
unequal health status, there seems to be little reason to expect that health promoting
wearable technologies will do anything other than reproduce, reinforce or even widen
entrenched patterns of health inequalities. Moreover, this recognition that opportunities
for autonomous action over health are socially mediated is important for understanding
associated concerns that health promoting wearable technologies may generate forms
of anxiety for their users, particularly if they find themselves unable to act to in line
with the information or advice provided. For relatively advantaged people who may
only lack the will power or motivation to improve their health, a wearable device may
provide the positive and supporting presence they need. But for people living in
adverse material and social circumstances, the presence of a device that informs them
that they have a potential health risk or fitness problem that they are unable to fix may
be a significant cause of concern and frustration. For these people, an inability to act in
accordance with the information and prompts provided and to achieve their health and
fitness goals may lead to the development of anxiety, stigma and a form of self-victim
blaming (Crawford 1977). By providing a constant stream of information about
alarming biomedical data, unhealthy habits and the seemingly unobtainable targets
they are failing to meet, such technologies may erode their users’ (perhaps fragile)
sense of control over their health, not to mention their feelings of self-esteem and well-
being.
The doubts we have rehearsed here resonate with some published professional
concerns and empirical literature. As Spence, a GP from Glasgow, suggests,
‘We must reflect on what we might lose here, rather than what we might gain.
Will apps simply empower patients to overdiagnosis and anxiety?’ (Husain and
Spence 2015: p. 2)
A further concern relates to studies which have indicated that there is a lack of
evidence demonstrating that wearable technologies actually do enable people to im-
prove their health in practice. For example, following randomised control trials con-
ducted with young adults seeking to reduce obesity, Jakicic and colleagues claimed that
‘devices that monitor and provide feedback on physical activity may not offer an
advantage over standard behavioral weight loss approaches’ (2016: p 1161). Similarly,
Spence has questioned the efficacy of wearable devices to deliver improvements in
health. He describes apps and devices as ‘untested’, ‘unscientific’ and ‘likely useless’
(Husain and Spence 2015: p. 2). Moreover, he raises concerns that promises that these
devices will enable their users to achieve better health may end up being an illusion:
‘death and disease is a lottery outside our control. So when the Bundeserving^
sick get sick, they feel cheated. These new technologies will serve only to fuel
this anger and resentment further’. (Husain and Spence 2015: pp. 2–3)
It may be suggested that highlighting health promoting wearable technologies’ limits
when it comes to supporting autonomous action is unnecessary: Is it not just unrea-
sonable to expect wearable technologies to be able to make the deep structural changes
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required for gains in substantive–relational autonomy? Perhaps so, however, we would
argue it is important to highlight these limits because, as we have seen, the rhetoric that
presents wearable technologies characterises them as devices that will support auton-
omous action by enabling their users to do more, to be more and to actually achieve
their health and fitness goals. It is precisely the distinction between procedural and
substantive–relational autonomy that helps to critically unpick this rhetoric.
5 Reconsidering Wearable Technologies and Procedural Autonomy
We now return to the suggestion that health promoting wearable technologies support
processes of deliberative autonomy over health. As we have noted, a good case can be
made for this assertion. People’s autonomous deliberation can be supported by external
factors including by support from and dialogue with other actors, and wearable
technologies can be seen as ‘non-human actors’ (Latour 2005) capable of supporting
the motivation of users and with whom users are in ‘dialogue’. This is reflected in
Sedaris’ characterisation of his Fitbit as a personal trainer spurring him on to do better.
To the extent that we can validly claim that the ‘voice’ of the relevant technology is in
broad alignment with (and responsive to) what Frankfurt (1989) sees as the users’
genuine higher-order desires—the voice and intrinsic motivations of our ‘better
selves’—then the claim for the autonomy enhancing potential of wearable technology
seems strong. However, for a human actor (e.g. a health professional or personal
trainer) to support another actor’s procedural autonomy is a highly skilled and
dilemma-laden practice (Cribb and Entwistle 2011), and this suggests that there are
grounds to be sceptical about the capacity of a ‘non-human actor’ to achieve this same
feat and to negotiate the same balancing acts. In what remains of the article, we raise
concerns that these technologies may not necessarily align with, or be responsive to,
users’ genuine volitions in a straightforward or consistent way. Wearable technologies
are products of wider biomedical and consumerist cultures that frequently issue
imperatives around health and fitness decisions. As such, many of these devices appear
to embody and reinforce particular epistemologies, values and norms. It is therefore
important to question the extent to which health promoting wearable technologies can
be thought of as supporting processes of autonomous deliberation.
Health promoting wearable technologies sit within a wider group of health promo-
tion strategies that use ‘behaviour change techniques’ to encourage people to take
healthier decisions and actions. A well-known example of such approaches is the
‘nudge’ theory developed by Thaler and Sunstein (2008). This describes how insights
from behavioural economics and so-called choice architecture can be deployed to
subtly manipulate people’s environments in order to make them more likely to make
particular choices. The paradigmatic example of nudge strategy in action is the
benevolent and health-conscious canteen manager who repositions the fruit ahead of
the chocolate cake on the counter so that their employees are more likely to choose a
healthy option. While no choices have been removed from employees—the cake
remains available—the change in the canteen environment makes it more likely that
employees will behave in the way the management wishes. Here, the emphasis is on
using forms of ‘soft power’ in the name of ‘liberal-paternalism’: people’s ability to
make decisions for themselves is preserved, but the intervention makes them more
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likely to decide according to some external set of values or objectives. Nudge tech-
niques have been particularly effective where health promotion campaigns have fo-
cussed on achieving behaviour change by influencing lifestyle choices. For example,
high-profile public health programmes in the UK have seen the introduction of food
labelling, health warnings on cigarettes and alcohol and the introduction of
‘Change4life’ and ‘This Girl Can’ exercise campaigns. Each of these might be
thought to boost procedural autonomy by providing information about and
encouragement for healthier decisions. However, they are also crafted with the
intention of interfering with people’s decisions and altering their behaviour.
Rather than providing health information in a neutral and balanced manner, these
campaigns aim to produce perlocutionary effects in people that encourage par-
ticular outcomes to be adopted. It is possible to read the strategic intent behind
such campaigns and to witness the way in which the norms and values of
biomedicine are being promoted through them as an example of ‘systematically
distorted communication’ (Habermas 1970).
Health promoting wearable technologies can be viewed in the same light. As Bakici
and Sanches suggest, ‘Information and communication technologies are not value-
neutral tools that reflect reality; they privilege some forms of action, and they limit
others’ (2014: p. 399). The ways in which they display and communicate information
means health promoting wearable technologies can operate as an advanced form of the
nudge strategy—as devices ‘programmed’ to improve health through influencing
decisions and altering habits and behaviour.
Generally speaking, no one is forced to use health promoting wearable technologies,
(although increasingly health insurance companies like Vitality and Optima Health are
rewarding their customers for doing so (Olson 2014) and there is a growing trend for
corporations to use activity trackers to promote the health and well-being of their
employees (Till 2014)).1 However, whether adopted voluntarily or otherwise, health
promoting wearable technologies cannot be seen as simply embodying or supporting
the autonomy of users. Many health promoting wearable technologies are designed to
encourage users to subscribe to particular norms and values and conform to specific
behaviours and practices. This might take an overt form through the issuing of
instructions and/or commands. For example, smart watches that monitor and display
their users’ heart rates will announce when it is ‘Time to stand!’, while diet apps
monitor the number of calories consumed per day and prescribe a cap on further
consumption. Even more radically, Forksy is an app designed to promote healthy
eating by ‘calling you out on your guilty pleasures and even have your friends monitor
what you eat and comment on poor choices’ (Yao 2016). These devices’ use of near-
punitive measures like peer pressure and social condemnation are intended to influence
1 A detailed analysis of insurers’ use of activity tracking technologies will have to wait for another occasion,
but it is worth briefly considering here the potential impact such schemes may have on peoples’ deliberative
autonomy. For example, some health insurers invite their customers to record exercise activity using fitness
tracking devices to earn ‘activity points’ which will lower the cost of the insurance plan. In such cases, it is
worth considering if customers sign up to these plans because they support their intrinsic desires for improved
health or whether people end up reluctantly exercising for the sake of an extrinsic financial incentive. Where
the latter occurs, concerns that these schemes may negatively affect people’s deliberative autonomy seem
credible. For more on this discussion, see Ashcroft’s (2011) analysis of the impact that financial incentives
may have on personal autonomy.
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the decisions that their users make. At the same time, they often reinforce positive
behaviour by issuing reward notifications and awards for activities, and may also
integrate with social media to generate competition between users to encourage
greater performance. Such technologies promote what Brockling (2016) describes as
an ‘entrepreneurialism of the self’: by internalising the narrative of competitive self-
improvement and the associated consequences of success and failure, users of wearable
technologies become the subject of powerful self-governance regimes.
In similar terms, these technologies can be viewed as introducing regimes of
neoliberal governmentality that turn individuals into ‘subjects of responsibility, auton-
omy and choice… [and require individuals] to act upon them through shaping and
utilizing their freedom’ (Rose 1999: p. 54). Again, Sedaris’ experience of using a Fitbit
provides a helpful illustration of the power of these devices to contribute to (extreme)
narratives of self-improvement:
‘I look back on the days I averaged only thirty thousand steps, and think,
Honestly, how lazy can you get? When I hit thirty-five thousand steps a day,
Fitbit sent me an e-badge, and then one for forty thousand, and forty-five
thousand. Now I’m up to sixty thousand, which is twenty-five and a half miles’.
(Sedaris 2014)
The influence of health promoting wearable technologies is also often reinforced
through covert means. Perhaps unsurprisingly, devices that monitor and analyse bio-
medical data employ biomedical terminology and epistemologies to frame their
prompts and instructions. Motivational prompts, advice and commands concerning
biomedical data—e.g. regarding blood pressure, calories consumed, heart rate—derive
authority from being delivered using the technical ‘voice of medicine’ reinforced by the
associated weight of expert knowledge (Barry et al. 2001). Moreover, in a systematic
review of the literature, Morgan reports that digital health technologies tend to be
‘focused on compliance and the construction of Bhealth threats^’ (2016: p. 10). By
framing the data they produce in biomedical terms, these devices may act as a conduit
for the colonisation of the user’s lifeworld (Habermas 1984), extending the reach of
medicalisation (Illich 1990) and reinforcing the view that the user’s health is subject to
risks that can be best mitigated through submission to professional diagnosis and
instruction.2 Meanwhile, well-being and fitness performance—hours slept, steps taken,
miles run, etc.—are given additional gravity by a ‘regime of numbers’ and the
possibilities for unequivocal evaluation offered by the analysis of quantitative metrics
(Rose 1991).
The manipulative potential of these health promoting wearable technologies can be
reinforced by their place within wider consumerist cultures which supply strong signals
and messages that may further compromise users’ procedural autonomy. These devices
are produced by large and often opaque and unaccountable technology corporations
that play an increasingly influential role in shaping people’s attitudes, beliefs and
preferences (Bernal 2014). The issues of individual privacy and manipulation
2 For a more substantial discussion of the potential risks of personal health monitoring devices colonising the
lifeworlds of their users, see Mittelstadt et al. 2014.
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resulting from corporate use of big data are also of obvious relevance to concerns about
the influences of health promoting wearable technologies (Mittelstadt and Floridi
2016). These devices also appear as ‘enhancing technologies’: products of a health
and beauty industry that uses the significant power of advertising to seek to achieve
preconceived goals and ideals (Elliot 2003). Particularly significant is the potential
these devices have for influencing the decisions and behaviours of their users by
encouraging them to internalise the perfectionist values and norms propagated by their
manufacturers. Much of the advertising employed in health and beauty serves to
manipulate the emotions of consumers, using the seductive language of hope, desire,
empowerment and success backed up with messages of fear, guilt and shame. As
Spence says:
‘health and fitness have become the new social currency, spawning a Bworried
well^ generation. Health Bbling^ is everywhere: all things Lycra, T shirts from
exotic charity half marathons, the chatter of personal trainers and training
programmes, and bikes that cost more than cars. Even food is no longer to be
enjoyed: it has become a pharmacopoeia of blended pulses, green leaves, and
nuts. Now, in many ways this is a great improvement on the drinking, smoking,
corned beef eating generation that came before. But our technologically advanced
society is avoidant, fearful, insecure, and worried about anything and everything.
We have an unhealthily health obsessed generation who will seize on these new
health apps and devices… AWild West approach to development is playing out
and will use the advertising classic—fear—to sell products. War, pestilence, and
famine are all out to grass; technology, medicine, and over-diagnosis are the new
riders of the Apocalypse’ (Husain and Spence 2015: pp. 2–3)
Through the careful manipulation of emotions, health promoting wearable technol-
ogies can submit their users to regimes of performative instruction and evaluation. To
the extent that they are successful, these devices fit Rose’s description of ‘technologies
of subjectivity… that enable strategies of power to infiltrate the interstices of the human
soul’ (1999: p. 8). In doing so, they may often suggest there is only one possible
decision to make: be healthier!
Thus, wearable technologies do more than just monitor, collect, analyse and display
biomedical data. They serve other purposes—and evaluating their contribution to their
users’ autonomy depends entirely on understanding where these purposes come from
and how they are embodied and promoted by the technologies. Such devices can
support users’ deliberative processes, but they can also interrupt, influence and under-
mine them, and hence their contribution to supporting procedural autonomy should be
questioned. Once again, this point is illustrated neatly by Sedaris’ encounters with a
wearable device. After losing control, he asks:
‘Why is it some people can manage a thing like a Fitbit, while others go off the
rails and allow it to rule, and perhaps even ruin, their lives?… my Fitbit died. I
was devastated when I tapped the broadest part of it and the little dots failed to
appear. Then I felt a great sense of freedom. It seemed that my life was now my
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own again. But was it? Walking twenty-five miles, or even running up the stairs
and back, suddenly seemed pointless, since, without the steps being counted and
registered, what use were they? I lasted five hours before I ordered a replacement,
express delivery. It arrived the following afternoon, and my hands shook as I tore
open the box. Ten minutes later, my new master strapped securely around my left
wrist, I was out the door, racing, practically running, to make up for lost time’.
(Sedaris 2014)
6 Conclusion
This paper has critically examined the claim that health promoting wearable technol-
ogies can support the autonomy that their users have over health through the monitor-
ing, collection, analysis and communication of biomedical data. We accept that there is
a case for thinking that the information and prompts provided by these devices can
support processes of procedural autonomy through facilitating deliberation and deci-
sion-making. In some cases, these devices may also support users’ capacity for
autonomous action, for example, through underpinning forms of motivation or habit
formation. However, we have suggested that these claims should be subject to critical
scrutiny, and that the potential of these technologies to support both autonomous
deliberation and autonomous action is limited in significant ways.
We have argued that health promoting wearable technologies have greater potential
to support processes of autonomous deliberation than they do capacities for autono-
mous action. This is significant since it is the genuine opportunities that people have to
act and to achieve their goals that is often considered morally and politically important.
Certainly, much of the appeal of health promoting wearable technologies stems from
their presentation as devices that will enable people to actually improve their health and
meet their fitness goals. We suggest that the limitations of these technologies to support
their users’ substantive–relational autonomy over health is worth emphasising, espe-
cially because these devices risk reproducing existing health inequalities across society
and creating additional burdens of anxiety and stigma.
We have also raised concerns about the potential for health promoting wearable
technologies to undermine their users’ deliberative and decision-making procedures.
Many of these devices are products of powerful biomedical and commercial corporations
with their own interests and agendas. Where these technologies reflect and reproduce
biomedical and commercial epistemologies, values and norms, especially where these are
not closely aligned with their users’ considered and ordered desires and rely on manip-
ulative techniques, they may significantly disrupt processes of free and independent
judgement, and thus may significantly undermine procedural autonomy. For these rea-
sons, we conclude that the autonomy enhancing potential of health promoting wearable
technologies is limited and carries risks and harms as well as benefits. Wear with care!
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